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<a href="http://www.mca-marines.org/gazette">www.mca-marines.org/gazette</a> 69 M a r i n e C o r p s G a z e t t e • M a y 2 0 0 9 Taliban and tribal commitment to a distant and corrupt central govern- ment. This will require special concen- tration of analytical effort. Fourth, assess what works at the op- erational and tactical levels and apply it across all battalions and advisory teams. The extent of individuality in deter- mining goals and tactics among the units in Iraq was extraordinary. Every battalion cannot be correct when the variance in patrol frequency, duration, and style is extreme. Amalgamate oper- ational wisdom and provide standards and expectancies about performance. Fifth, hedge the strategy. Our current strategy is to employ sufficient U.S troops and money, together with modest aid from some NATO allies, to build a mod- ern nation in a vast, backward country with a subsistence economy, an unedu- cated work force, a flourishing drug trade, and loyalty to subtribes rather than to a functioning central government. The “new” operational approach is to drive out the local Taliban, deploy small Amer- ican units among the population, and dole out local funding to gain popular support, while raising local militia and training Afghan police and soldiers to take over the protection task. Although this operational approach reflects standard counterinsurgency doctrine, a Defense official told The Washington Post it was not employed in Afghanistan before 2009 because: . . . we have been under-resourced . . . . This will be the first time we will have the capacity to hold key areas, protect the population and start bringing in projects. That’s what will make all the difference.13 According to this view, the basic prob- lem has been mechanistic; that is, an inadequate U.S. troop density. This view does not address other factors, such as a chaotic U.S. and NATO command and control system, a Euro- pean unwillingness to take risk, and a badly flawed host-nation government. It does not explain why the situation deteriorated in locations where there were ample troops, or why risk assess- ment by a succession of generals never made it clear to the White House that three more brigades would provide the tipping point to move from gradual failure to gradual success. Perhaps an additional three U.S. brigades will make “all the difference.” But 60,000 U.S. soldiers is still a tiny number compared to the size of the country, with a gigantic sanctuary stretching along the eastern frontier. And given a severe global recession that will last for years, a continuous flow of copious funds from the United States and Europe to occupy and rebuild Afghanistan is unlikely. Risk assessment demands a hedge strategy in case funds are insufficient to build a modern nation, to include a sound economy, eradication of drug trafficking, an uncorrupt civil service, elected officials in place of tribes, and the Western concept of the rule of law. Our enemy, al-Qaeda, has been se- verely weakened and operates from bases in western Pakistan. The Taliban, as a heterogeneous ally of al-Qaeda, is a secondary target. A fallback military strategy with fewer resources would focus on training and supporting Afghan police and soldiers, plus suffi- cient U.S. combat units to destroy any large gathering of enemy forces. In sum, garbage and lies reside in- side any large organization in the form of optimistic forecasting. A healthy human mind accentuates the positive. Thus, we stress that a particular surgery has a 90 percent success rate, rather than to admit there’s a 10 percent chance of dying. We hold onto our losses when the stock market goes down, because selling is an admission of failure, even when it’s the rational choice. Similarly, it’s especially tough for a commander to objectively assess his own battlespace. Hence there is a need in the Afghanistan war for an independent risk assessor who can expertly calculate the rough odds of succeeding in the mission of nation building versus the size of the U.S. force commitment. The variable that most diminishes that degree of risk is the behavior of the Pashtun tribe that recognizes no bor- der between Afghanistan and western Pakistan. Assessing tribal politics and commitment, however, is the subject area where American technology and warfighting skills help the least. Thus it’s not garbage and lies that bedevil us; rather, it’s the uncertainties and the un- knowns of nation building in an Is- lamic culture. Notes 1. Ricks, Thomas, “For Vietnam Vet Tony Zinni, Another War on Shaky Territory,” The Washington Post, Washington, DC, 23 Decem- ber 2003. 2. Davidson, Phillip B., Vietnam at War, Pre- sidio Press, 1988, pp. 348–349. 3. Powell, Colin, transcript of Meet the Press, 10 June 2007. 4. Ibid. 5. Ibid. 6. Glanz, James, “Official History Spotlights Iraq Rebuilding Blunders,” The New York Times, New York, 13 December 2008, p. 1. 7. Petraeus, GEN David H., USA, “Battling for Iraq,” The Washington Post, Washington, DC, 26 September 2004, p. B07. 8. Dash, Eric and Julie Creswell, “Citigroup Saw No Red Flags Even as It Made Bolder Bets,” The New York Times, 23 November 2008, p. 28. 9. Cheney, Vice President Richard, interview on The News Hour, 14 January 2009. 10. Ibid. 11. Kilcullen, David, The Accidental Guerrilla, Oxford University Press, UK, 2009, p. 159. 12. Ibid. 13. Constable, Pamela, “Resistance to U.S. Plan for Afghanistan,” The Washington Post, Wash- ington, DC, 16 January 2009, p. A16. Agree or Disagree? Join the discussion at <a href="http://www.mca-marines.org/gazette/West">www.mca-</a> <a href="http://www.mca-marines.org/gazette/West">marines.org/gazette/West.</a> Join the Debate
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