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<a href="http://www.mca-marines.org/gazette">www.mca-marines.org/gazette</a> 67 M a r i n e C o r p s G a z e t t e • M a y 2 0 0 9 one course to another. In 2005 the Multinational Force-Iraq headquarters developed an assessment tool that com- bined several measures into a single bar chart that changed from red to green according to the trends. In 2006 the bar was shifting from orange into red. I asked a senior general what would happen if the current strategy didn’t work. “We’ll have to muddle through,” he replied. By mid-2006 Iraq was falling apart due to rampaging al-Qaeda and Shi’ite death squads. To reverse the rising risk of failure required two changes. First, the sectarian Iraqi Government had to permit U.S. special operations forces to strike at the Shi’ite death squads. Under pressure, Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki allowed such strikes. Second, the support or quiescence of the Sunni population toward al-Qaeda and other irreconcilable insurgent groups had to be reversed. But the U.S. command in Iraq, the USCentCom commander, and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs agreed with one another that the Sun- nis viewed U.S. soldiers as irritants and not allies. More U.S. soldiers doing the job of Iraqi soldiers would result in more U.S. casualties, without reversing the downward spiral. American soldiers could not protect a Sunni population that viewed them as hostile occupiers. But just when the trends were most dire in Baghdad, the war had already turned around in western Al Anbar Province, because the Sunni tribes had changed sides. That set the ground- work for the success of the surge strat- egy in eastern Iraq, although it wasn’t anticipated by the surge planners. Ac- cording to a senior adviser on the Multinational Force staff, the “pattern we are seeing (in 2007) runs counter to what we expected in the ‘surge’.”11 At that critical juncture from mid- 2006 to mid-2007, an independent risk assessment team would have added value. The belief that U.S. soldiers ex- acerbated the insurgency was based on a 2005 study supervised by a major general, with the concurrence of the di- vision commanders. But by the fall of 2006 numerous parties—the brigade commander in Ramadi, the senior civilian analyst for the Marine expedi- tionary force (MEF), American advis- ers out in the countryside—were reporting that a sea change in Sunni at- titudes contradicted the 2005 study. Indeed, the MEF was busily organiz- ing tribal militias. A risk assessment team would have picked up those signs of precipitous change. Instead, the USCentCom commander testified to Congress in 2006 that Anbar was not under con- trol.12 Although a “tipping point” crit- ical to the war’s outcome had been reached, it was not placed within a strategic framework that would inform all interested parties, including the White House, Congress, the press, and military staffs outside Iraq. While risk assessment can be ex- pected to identify and highlight such tipping points, it cannot predict when One staff should be held responsible for conductinng the risk assessment so deployed forces know the variables they face. (Photo by Sgt Ray Lewis.)
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www.mca-marines.org/gazette