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64 <a href="http://www.mca-marines.org/gazette">www.mca-marines.org/gazette</a> M a r i n e C o r p s G a z e t t e • M a y 2 0 0 9 IDEAS & ISSUES (FUTURE WAR) T his article addresses why as- sessments were poor in Iraq and what can be done to im- prove risk assessment in Afghanistan. Seven months after the invasion of Iraq in 2003, retired Ma- rine Gen Anthony C. “Tony” Zinni gave a blistering speech. “My contem- poraries, our feelings and sensitivities were forged on the battlefields of Viet- nam,” he said, “where we heard the garbage and lies, and we saw the sacri- fice. I ask you, is it happening again?”1 The audience of Navy and Marine of- ficers rose in applause, presumably cheering a criticism of civilian officials, and not of themselves. That was a misleading illusion. In Vietnam, generals as well as policymak- ers and politicians contributed to fail- ure. In 1966 President Lyndon B. Johnson and Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara ordered GEN William C. Westmoreland, the com- mander in South Vietnam, to undertake a strategy to “attrit [sic] . . . [the Communist forces] at a rate as high as their capability to put men into the field.”2 Westmoreland enthusiastically championed the attrition strategy. Inside Garbage, Lies, and Uncertainties Deception versus risk in war by Bing West >Mr. West is a former Marine and former Assistant Secretary of Defense. A mili- tary author who has made numerous trips to Iraq and Afghanistan, he is writing a book about the war in Afghanistan and the role of courage in society. A dishonest assessment risks their lives. (Photo by LCpl Josh Cox.)
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