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<a href="http://www.mca-marines.org/gazette">www.mca-marines.org/gazette</a> 29 M a r i n e C o r p s G a z e t t e • M a y 2 0 0 9 This Cargo UAS should be kept dis- tinct from a CASEVAC capable UAS as well as refraining from adding other mission enhancements (sic) to the plat- form. A reconfigurable platform will involve many moving parts that may increase its own logistics require- ments. As the Marine Corps investigates plat- forms and concepts of employment for a UALS, it may be more cost effective to include the requirements for a UALS in our future Tier III system. As we have discovered in aviation, costs may be increased by having multimis- sion aircraft, but those costs usually pale in comparison to the costs of sup- porting multiple type/model/series of aircraft. It would seem that by includ- ing the requirements for a UALS in our search for a Tier III system that the other requirements, such as intelli- gence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) and strike, could be included ca- pabilities, particularly given the minia- turization of ISR payloads and the increased accuracy of smaller precision weapons. Moreover, it may make sense to have at least a camera capability in- cluded in the UALS for situational awareness and possible route clearance and security. The UNS also states a re- quirement for “at least up to 250 knots” and a 1,600-pound payload de- liverable in four increments, internal or external, on a single mission. All of these requirements must be investi- gated and verified during the coming debates. There are numerous considerations that must be addressed when consider- ing employment of a UALS. Opera- tional considerations include airspace deconfliction, attaching/detaching or loading and unloading cargo, down- wash/safety/brownout in landing zones if the UALS is a vertical takeoff and landing platform, sea state and wind conditions, takeoff and landing in complex or uneven terrain, the ability to work at high (over 10,000 feet MSL) altitude, and the ability to avoid ground fire, such as small arms or man- portable air defense systems. UALSs will probably be more vulnerable than manned aircraft; they are not likely to have chaff or electronic countermea- sures since these systems would reduce cargo payload. On the other hand, tac- tical measures could mitigate the enemy’s willingness to engage UALSs. We may want the enemy to expend ex- pensive and hard to get missiles on rel- atively low-cost UASs, and it may teach the enemy that shooting at our UASs connotes a high probability of personal risk when a combat air patrol aircraft (manned or unmanned) engages the enemy shooter. None of this is to inti- mate that the employment of UALSs is too hard but, rather, that all of these discussions must take place and solu- tions must be reached if we are to em- ploy the capability to its fullest. The bottom line arguments in sup- port of a UALS seem to be these: it will decrease risk to surface transportation vehicles, expensive manned aircraft and, most importantly, Marines, thus saving lives; it will free manned assault transport aircraft to conduct infantry assault operations; it will save money; it will increase flexibility and responsive- ness; it can be risked during periods of low visibility and/or dangerous situa- tions; and the loss of an unmanned UALS will have little impact on the politics and policies that are a part of any military operation, whether com- bat or humanitarian assistance and dis- aster relief. If we agree that the UALS is a capability that we want and need, then the discussions need to take place sooner rather than later regarding ex- actly how we want to define and em- ploy this capability. Notes 1. Government Accountability Office report to the Subcommittee on Air and Land Forces, Committee on Armed Services, House of Rep- resentatives titled, “Unmanned Aircraft Sys- tems: Additional Actions Needed to Improve Management and Integration of DOD Efforts to Support Warfighter Needs,” November 2008. 2. FAA Office of Commercial Space Transporta- tion Report, “Suborbital Reusable Launch Vehi- cles and Emerging Markets,” Washington, DC, February 2005. 3. McCoy, MAJ John V., “Unmanned Aerial Logistics Vehicles—A Concept Worth Pursu- ing,” Army Logistician, 1 March 2004, available <a href="http://www.almc.army.mil/alog/issues/MarApr04/Unmanned_Aerial_Logistics.htm">at http://www.almc.army.mil/alog/issues/Mar</a> <a href="http://www.almc.army.mil/alog/issues/MarApr04/Unmanned_Aerial_Logistics.htm">Apr04/Unmanned_Aerial_Logistics.htm, ac-</a> cessed 13 May 2008. 4. I&L, Headquarters Marine Corps, UNS for the cargo UAS, dated 27 August 2008. 5. Deputy Commandant for Combat Develop- ment and Integration, United States Marine Corps 2008 MAGTF Capability List, Marine Corps Combat Development Command, Quantico, dated 5 May 2008, pp. 1–4 and 14. 6. Program Snapshot, “Medium Tactical Vehi- cle Replacement Program Marks Delivery Mile- stone,” Seapower, June 2008, pp. 48–50, av<a href="http://www.seapower-digital.com/seapower/200807/?pg=50">ailable at www.seapower-digital.com/</a> <a href="http://www.seapower-digital.com/seapower/200807/?pg=50">seapower/200807/?pg=50, accessed 11 Novem-</a> <a href="http://www.seapower-digital.com/seapower/200807/?pg=50">ber 2008.</a> . . . it may be more cost effective to include the requirements for a UALS in our future Tier III system. Agree or Disagree? Join the discussion at <a href="http://www.mca-marines.org/gazette/Powers">www.mca-</a> <a href="http://www.mca-marines.org/gazette/Powers">marines.org/gazette/Powers.</a> Join the Debate
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