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28 <a href="http://www.mca-marines.org/gazette">www.mca-marines.org/gazette</a> M a r i n e C o r p s G a z e t t e • M a y 2 0 0 9 IDEAS & ISSUES (AVIATION) dispersed combat units. We need a real dialogue to discuss what would consti- tute a paradigm shift in how we view aerial vehicles in general and UALSs in particular. The Marine Corps also needs to an- swer definitively two other essential questions: how will we staff our UALS units, and who will be our UAS oper- ators and leaders? For any new, great idea generated in the Marine Corps, there are two essential elements that will determine its success or failure— money and force structure. Under the current Air Force system for example, every new Predator or Reaper operator has to complete undergraduate pilot training and upgrade training for his particular type of aircraft before he masters the UAS. That represents an investment of more than 1 year (and over $1 million), plus the cost of the UAS training program—for pilots who will most likely serve only one tour in a UAS squadron. The Marine Corps’ approach, and I think the correct one, is the creation of a specialized cadre of enlisted UAS operators (military occu- pational specialty (MOS) 7314). Tak- ing a page from the Army and Marine Corps playbooks, most of the mission commanders could be warrant officers or experienced enlisted personnel. The recent UAS Operational Advisory Group (OAG) recognized that the role of mission commander, for example, should not specifically be a commis- sioned officer and that there are estab- lished, adequate prerequisites for mission commander designation. The OAG also discussed the fact that while there currently is an enlisted UAS MOS to provide continuity, there is no corresponding officer continuity. Their recommendation was to create a UAS MOS for officers. Utilizing this ap- proach, officers who have extensive ex- perience with a UAS would lead UALS units. Providing the force structure for UALS units is probably the most diffi- cult obstacle to overcome. Force struc- ture allocation, absent increases in end strength, is a zero-sum game. Addition of force structure in one area requires a commensurate reduction in force structure somewhere else. One poten- tial solution is the number of billets that will become available in the cur- rent plan of decommissioning our EA–6B squadrons. If UALSs reduce the number of trucks required by the MLG, then many of the billets cur- rently dedicated to landbased opera- tions could become UALS billets. The final solution may be a combination of these options plus other potential “bill payers” not mentioned here. The final question is whether the Marine Corps can afford to purchase an unmanned vehicle whose sole pur- pose is aerial logistics. There is a signif- icant statement in the UNS that states: The UALS is a very sophisticated “truck” that will require different maintenance support than our wheeled logistics vehicles. (Photo courtesy of the author.)
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