29page

<a href="http://www.mca-marines.org/gazette">www.mca-marines.org/gazette</a> 27 M a r i n e C o r p s G a z e t t e • M a y 2 0 0 9 sions, such as assault transport. A seem- ingly more important research and analysis question is how UALSs com- plement, replace, and subsidize surface transport. If a primary concern in the acquisition of a UALS capability is de- creasing risk to Marines, then one need only ask the question: who is most at risk in conducting logistics transporta- tion operations? The ready answer is the Marines who operate our convoys. Whether attacks are executed by unat- tended improvised explosive devices (IEDs) or through complex, well-or- chestrated ambushes and assaults, it has been our convoys that have been most subjected to the risk that can be miti- gated by the employment of UALSs. The essential discussion that must take place is how the UALS can or will af- fect overland resupply operations by the Marine logistics group (MLG). It is difficult for any aviation asset to compete with our landbased motor transport systems, particularly the medium tactical vehicle replacement (MTVR), on a strict cost analysis basis. The MTVR has an onroad payload ca- pacity of 15 tons and offroad capacity of 7.1 tons, hence the moniker “7-ton truck.” The MTVR is considered one of the safer vehicles in combat because it sits so far off the ground, which mit- igates the force of an IED attack, and because of the available armor package. The vehicles range in price from $200,000 to $450,000 per vehicle, de- pending on the variant. About 80 per- cent of the fleet is cargo variants.6 The initial procurement costs are far less than any aerial vehicle, manned or un- manned. Table 2 presents a rough order of magnitude comparison of the approximate costs and payloads of the primary logistics vehicles that the Ma- rine Corps will be using for the fore- seeable future and includes estimates for UALSs and precision aerial delivery systems (PADSs). Second, we must contrast UALS payload capacity against manned surface and air systems because, while it carries less per load, it can ostensibly operate far more contin- uously, particularly at night and during periods of reduced visibility. Except for a brief excursion with Pi- oneer when the vehicles were part of the division structure, essentially every- thing that flies is considered an avia- tion asset. But as a lieutenant colonel from I&L expressed to me during a live demonstration of an unmanned vehi- cle intended for autonomous resupply of dispersed units, “You aviators just don’t get it. It’s a (expletive deleted) truck! Give it to us.” And therein is the next topic that must generate a robust dialogue. If the Marine Corps is to em- ploy UALSs to their fullest capability, should they be part of the MLG struc- ture or remain an aviation asset? If the MLG can support and schedule trucks for convoys, so the argument goes, they can support and schedule UASs for lo- gistical resupply. If we view the UALS as just another “truck,” it is a very so- phisticated truck with numerous re- quirements for operations, main- tenance, and employment that do not exist for landbased systems. Another option is to retain UALSs as part of our aviation structure and assign detach- ments to the MLG. This would retain the expertise of aviation-related opera- tions while providing more flexible, de- centralized support to our widely Table 2. Estimated capability and cost comparison. (1. 1987 dollars. 2. MTVR data obtained from Marine detachment at Army Motor Transport School.) UH–1Y CH–46E CH–53K MV–22A MTVR UALS PADS Cargo capacity 6.66 8.763 50 15 14-28 .6-3.5 .4-10 (x1000 pounds) Unit cost ($millions) 6 61 25 68 .2-.45 3-10 .065- .1 Maintenance man hours 17 25 25 20 .52 5-10 N/A per operating hour Table 1. 2008 MAGTF capability list supporting capability and UALSs. Supporting Supporting Capability # Capability 14 Sustain widely dispersed forces, to include small units 33 Conduct and support humanitarian assistance/ disaster relief 47 Plan and provide mission-specific tailored supplies and equipment sets to forces 53 Provide sustained logistics from the strategic through the tactical levels 59 Plan and execute logistics operations to enable crisis response 69 Plan and conduct continuous reconstitution of prepositioned equipment/supply sets and war reserve
29page

www.mca-marines.org/gazette