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37 rea in one-syllable words. Shame on the world for not listening. Jang Song-thaek’s downfall was predictable, then, because of the nature of an authoritarian regime in transition, which North Korea has been since Kim Jong-il passed away in December 2011. Because Kim’s son, Kim Jong-un, does not yet hold all the available power within the system, a coalition is necessary to sustain his rule. This coalition remains viable so long as it can present a credible threat of overthrow in the event that Kim be- haves counter to the interests of the coalition as a whole. For the time being, this framework puts Kim at risk. In a po- sition of unconsolidated leadership, it is (or was) broadly in his interest to cooperate with the ruling coalition that his father built around him. Bearing this in mind, however, it is also in the interest of the leader and his closest aides to seek unassailable power, thus eliminating any credible threat of displacement. The only way to achieve this goal is to secure as much of the available power as possible to defend against attack from below. Therefore, from the beginning of his rule, Kim could be expected to make a se- ries of power grabs against the others in the coalition. Each one would promote the power of the grabber by bringing economic resources previously held by others under his or his allies’ control, and also by sending a message describing his power in all-too tangible terms to the remainder of the contemporary political elite. The likelihood of such power grabs taking place is primarily de- pendent upon the relative likelihood of them succeeding. Their success depends on the power of the leader, as well as the pow- er of the target. The closer the two are in power terms, the riskier the grab, and the more overt and demonstrative the show of force by which it must be undertaken. For this reason, the KCNA article on the Politburo meeting where Jang was detained in such a theatrical manner, while fas- cinatingly detailed and highly revelatory in some senses, does not explain the root cause of his removal. To those who read it and mused, “Ah, so Jang was too close to China,” a plausible response might be, “Perhaps so, but China’s influence in North Korea will not diminish; rather, the resources Jang Song-thaek once controlled will surely be reallocated, falling under the remit of another.” The rationale outlined by the KCNA article cannot have been the root cause of the purge; power cannot be creat- ed or destroyed, only reallocated. The “China thesis” is just one example of mistaking the symptom of a political malaise for its root cause. Kim Jong-un’s Christmas power grab against Jang does not prove he is young or impetuous or inexperienced or his father’s son or anything else, although he may be all or some of those things. Rather, it shows that he and his clique are responding to the market in which they find themselves. Or, to paraphrase Mao Zedong, the swamp in which they swim. It is a market governed by political power; socialism may be a dead letter in North Korea, but despite the presence of a market economy, this most vital of commodities still cannot be bought. It must be taken. ABOUT ThIs COLUMn Christopher Green is the manager of international affairs for Daily NK, an online periodical reporting on North Korean affairs from Seoul. The opinions expressed here are the author’s and do not necessarily represent those of Groove Korea. For more information, visit dailynk.com. Hair consultant from UK. Trained at Vidal Sassoon and TONY&GUY in UK Hair Salon in Sinchon
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